“demands,” Henry concludes, “as its ultimate Trovirdine Autophagy possibility, a consciousness with no planet
“demands,” Henry concludes, “as its ultimate possibility, a consciousness without world, an acosmic flesh.” By this he understands, following Maine de Biran, the “immanent corporeality” of our “I can”.This “transcendental I can” should be to be thought as a living potential offered to us, a capacity that initial and foremost makes probable the unlimited repetition of our concrete capacities.The task of unfolding the autoaffective structure of life as a result is assigned to the flesh as the material concretion of the selfgivenness of our innermost selfhood, i.e ipseity.The flesh accomplishes, as it have been, its translation into “affective formations” and for that reason embodies “the fundamental habitus PubMed ID:http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21316481 of transcendental life,” which make up the “lifeworld” as a globe of life in its innermost essence.Henry (pp).Henry (p).Cf.Henry (pp.).Henry (a, p).A study of such transcendental habitus and its affective phenomenological genesis in life is provided by Gely .If nothing else this implies a revolutionary reorientation with the socalled problematic of intersubjectivity, that no longer proceeds from the givenness with the ego, but rather in the aforementioned “condition of sonship” as a “preunifying essence” (Henry a, p).Henry carries this theme further in Incarnation in the context of a rereading of the notion of “the mystical body of Christ” (cf.Henry , pp); on Henry’s transformation from the problematic of intersubjectivity see Khosrokhavar .In the “metaphysics of the individual” towards the critique of societyWith this we’ve got a additional indication of how transcendence (i.e the planet) arising from immanence (i.e life) should be to be understood then as something aside from a “non genuinely included” transcendence (Transzendenz irreellen Beschlossenseins) namely, as “affective formation”, “condensation”, and even as the “immemorial memory” of our flesh.But may well these descriptions of life’s selfmovement be represented additional precisely How are we to think Henry’s claim that “the world’s reality has nothing at all to perform with its truth, with its way of displaying, with all the `outside’ of a horizon, with any objectivity”how are we to think that the “reality that constitutes the world’s content is life” Viewed against this background, Henry’s theory in the duplicity of appearing ostensibly leads to a seemingly insurmountable difficulty how can the notion of an “acosmic flesh” in its “radical independence” as the sole reality of life actually found that which can be outdoors of it, the planet It’s precisely this that we need to now reflect on a lot more explicitly if we wish to show that his strategy can be created beneficial for issues that arise in the philosophy of society and culture too as the concerns posed by political philosophy.The key objection to Henry’s reinscription with the world within life proceeds in the following way the “counterreduction” aims to located the visible display of your planet within the invisible selfrevelation of absolute life, yet doesn’t this disqualification of the world set into operation a “complete scorn for all of life’s actual determinations” within the world With this all as well radical inquiry into the originary do we not turn into trapped inside a “mysticism of immanence,” that remains enclosed in its own night, forever incapable of getting expressed and coming in to the planet To summarize Bernhard Waldenfels’ exemplary formulation of this critique, “doesn’t the adverse characterization of selfaffection as nonintentional, nonrepresentational, and nonsighted.