“demands,” Henry concludes, “as its ultimate possibility, a consciousness with out globe
“demands,” Henry concludes, “as its ultimate possibility, a consciousness without having globe, an acosmic flesh.” By this he understands, following Maine de Biran, the “immanent corporeality” of our “I can”.This “transcendental I can” should be to be believed as a living capacity offered to us, a capacity that initially and foremost tends to make feasible the limitless repetition of our concrete capacities.The task of unfolding the autoaffective structure of life therefore is assigned to the flesh as the material concretion in the selfgivenness of our innermost selfhood, i.e ipseity.The flesh accomplishes, since it were, its translation into “affective formations” and consequently embodies “the fundamental habitus PubMed ID:http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21316481 of transcendental life,” which make up the “lifeworld” as a globe of life in its innermost essence.Henry (pp).Henry (p).Cf.Henry (pp.).Henry (a, p).A study of such transcendental habitus and its affective phenomenological genesis in life is offered by Gely .If nothing else this implies a revolutionary reorientation from the socalled problematic of intersubjectivity, that no longer proceeds in the givenness of the ego, but rather from the aforementioned “condition of sonship” as a “preunifying essence” (Henry a, p).Henry carries this theme trans-ACPD Autophagy further in Incarnation in the context of a rereading with the notion of “the mystical physique of Christ” (cf.Henry , pp); on Henry’s transformation of your problematic of intersubjectivity see Khosrokhavar .In the “metaphysics with the individual” towards the critique of societyWith this we’ve got a further indication of how transcendence (i.e the globe) arising from immanence (i.e life) is usually to be understood then as a thing besides a “non definitely included” transcendence (Transzendenz irreellen Beschlossenseins) namely, as “affective formation”, “condensation”, and even as the “immemorial memory” of our flesh.However may well these descriptions of life’s selfmovement be represented more precisely How are we to consider Henry’s claim that “the world’s reality has practically nothing to do with its truth, with its way of displaying, together with the `outside’ of a horizon, with any objectivity”how are we to think that the “reality that constitutes the world’s content is life” Viewed against this background, Henry’s theory with the duplicity of appearing ostensibly results in a seemingly insurmountable challenge how can the notion of an “acosmic flesh” in its “radical independence” as the sole reality of life basically discovered that that is outdoors of it, the globe It is actually precisely this that we have to now reflect on additional explicitly if we wish to show that his strategy is usually created useful for problems that arise within the philosophy of society and culture at the same time as the concerns posed by political philosophy.The main objection to Henry’s reinscription in the planet within life proceeds within the following way the “counterreduction” aims to found the visible display of your planet within the invisible selfrevelation of absolute life, however doesn’t this disqualification in the globe set into operation a “complete scorn for all of life’s actual determinations” within the globe With this all too radical inquiry into the originary do we not turn out to be trapped in a “mysticism of immanence,” that remains enclosed in its own evening, forever incapable of getting expressed and coming into the globe To summarize Bernhard Waldenfels’ exemplary formulation of this critique, “doesn’t the adverse characterization of selfaffection as nonintentional, nonrepresentational, and nonsighted.