Even when they weren’t willing to attribute that state to
Even after they weren’t willing to attribute that state to any in the person members, and they were prepared to attribute a mental state to all members of a group even after they were not willing to attribute that state for the group itself. In turn, the outcomes of Experiment two reveal that that such ascriptions recruit brain regions linked with thinking about the minds of individuals, i.e brain regions connected with theoryofmind, each when theoryofmind use is named for explicitly and when it arises spontaneously. Previous investigation has demonstrated consistent engagement of a specific network of regions, which includes MPFC, RTPJ, and precuneus, during inferences concerning the minds of individual persons, i.e for the duration of theoryofmind. Across two tasks, we observed activation within this network when participants study or made predictions about group agents. Within the directed theoryofmind job, participants study regarding the states of folks, group agents, and inanimate objects. In both circumstances, activation connected with groups was indistinguishable from that associatedwith consideration of men and women. Wholebrain analyses, conjunction evaluation, and ROI analyses all assistance the conclusion that cognitive processes linked with considering concerning the minds ofPLOS One particular plosone.Bay 59-3074 web orgTheoryOfMind and Group AgentsFigure 2. Conjunction analyses. Leading: A conjunction evaluation revealed conjoint activation in MPFC, TPJ (bilaterally), and precuneus when participants read in regards to the mental states of people and groups, in comparison with a nonmental control situation. Bottom: These regions also overlapped with these recruited by the theoryofmind localizer. Activations are displayed on a canonical brain image. doi:0.37journal.pone.00534.gindividuals have been also recruited when participants thought regarding the `mind’ of a group agent. Nevertheless, it is actually worth noting the possibility that participants may have been thinking to some degree about the minds of individual group members, and that this might have accounted for the observed activation in theoryofmind regions through consideration of group agents. This possibility is weakened, but not completely ruled out, by (a) the fact that, unlike previous research, no individuals were described or shown in the group Table 2. Regions emerging in the conjunction analysis.situation and (b) the observation that perceivers interpret sentences about group mental states as ascribing mental states for the group agent itself in Experiment , and (c) the current observation that the additional perceivers contemplate the `mind’ on the group, the significantly less they contemplate the minds of its members [8]. Past analysis has documented the selectivity with the RTPJ for attributing representational mental content, for instance beliefs and intentions, to other folks [22,25,57,six,62], compared to other sorts of attributions, for instance those concerning a person’s physical look, preferences, or character traits. In this investigation, neither the mere presence of someone nor the need to make other forms of inferences about that particular person was connected with as considerably activation in this region as attributing representational mental states. Accordingly, the truth that the RTPJ activated indistinguishably during consideration of folks and groups (but distinguished both in the inanimate handle condition) is definitely an in particular compelling suggestion that participants applied similar processes for understanding PubMed 
ID:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24126911 the representational mental states of individuals and group agents. Though the specific con.